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Apresentação
Burbules faz uma sÈrie de consideraÁıes para montar
um conceito teÛrico do virtual. Primeiro, examina os
quatro processos da vinculaÁ„o (interesse, envolvi-
mento, imaginaÁ„o e interaÁ„o) para que ocorra a
imers„o, muito importantes para entender-se o poten-
cial educacional da virtualidade. Segundo, aplica o con-
ceito do virtual ‡ discuss„o do espaÁo e do tempo virtu-
ais decorrendo daÌ que, ‡ medida que os espaÁos vir-
tuais tornam-se conhecidos e importantes, passam a
ser lugares  virtuais. Essa transformaÁ„o pode aconte-
cer de duas maneiras: por arquitetura  e por mapea-
mento, em plausÌvel paralelo aos pontos de vista res-
pectivamente do professor e do aluno. Este trabalho
pode ser visto como uma tentativa de desmistificar a
virtualidade como sendo exclusivamente tecnolÛgica e
de encar·-la como a base de um conceito educacio-
nal. Destacam-se, neste artigo, os conceitos de vir-
tualidade, lugares virtuais educacionais e arquitetura e
mapeamento.
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The Virtual
The term ìvirtual realityî (VR) was
reputedly first coined by Jaron Lanier, head of
Virtual Programming Language, Inc.1 It is usually
taken to refer to a computer-mediated simulation
that is three-dimensional, multisensory, and
interactive, so that the userís experience is ìas
ifî inhabiting and acting within an external
environment. A few typical definitions emphasize
these main elements:
The illusion of participation in a synthetic
environmentÖ.VR relies on three-dimensional,
stereoscopic, head-tracked display, hand-body
tracking and binaural sound.2
A combination of computer and interface
devices (goggles, gloves, etc.) that present a
user with the illusion of being in a three
dimensional world of computer-generated
objects.3
Virtual Reality (VR) is minimally defined as a
computer generated experience consisting of
stereoscopic, real-time, viewer-centered
computer graphics. A VR experience may be
further, and significantly enriched by the
inclusion of spatially located sound, haptics,
and smell.4
A computer system used to create an artificial
world in which the user has the impression of
being in that world and with the ability to
navigate through the world and manipulate
objects in the world.5
A VR is a computer world that tricks the senses
or mind.6
There are two main characteristics
revealed by these definitions which, I will argue,
inhibit a deeper understanding of  ìvirtualityî or
ìthe virtualî (terms I will prefer here to  ìvirtual
realityî).  The first assumption is to put the matter
of technology at the forefront: VR is computer
generated; it involves the use of goggles, gloves,
or head-tracking devices, etc. Yet the key feature
of the virtual is not the particular technology that
produces the sense of immersion, but the sense
of immersion itself (whatever might bring it
about), which gives the virtual its
phenomenological quality of an “as if”
experience.7 When we think of the virtual in this
way, we see that all sorts of things can create
this sense of ìas ifî: watching a film, reading a
book, listening to music, or just being caught up
in a reverie or conversation, for example; all of
these can trigger engrossing experiences of
multisensory worlds which, when we are
immersed in them, fill our experiential horizons.
There is nothing necessarily computer-based
about such immersive experiences: some
writers characterize science fiction literature as
a virtual reality; others, shopping malls.8
The second assumption of most of these
definitions is to characterize VR as a substitute
for reality, as an ìillusionî or a ìtrick.î Terms often
used in place of ìvirtual realityî include ìsimulated
realityî or ìartificial reality.î The problem with this
view is that it assumes an overly sharp
separation between the ìvirtualî and the ìrealî
ó the real seems to be a simple, unproblematic
given that we perceive and interact with directly,
while the virtual means something more like
ìsyntheticî or ìillusory.î9 Yet any reality we inhabit
is to some extent actively filtered, interpreted,
constructed, or made; it is not merely an
unproblematic given, while the virtual is not
merely imaginary. The virtual should not be
understood as a simulated reality exposed to
us, which we passively observe, but a context
where our own active response and involvement
are part of what gives the experience its veracity
and meaningfulness. Hence the virtual is better
seen as a medial  concept, neither real nor
imaginary, or better, both real and imaginary. In
this sense ìvirtual realityî is a misnomer.
For many critics of technology, this
contrasting of the ìsyntheticî world with a more
immediately sensible ìrealî or ìauthenticî world
begins with arguments derived from Martin
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Heideggerís ìThe Question Concerning
Technology.î10 Heidegger contrasts two ways of
interacting with the natural world. From the
technological standpoint, nature is revealed as
a ìstanding reserveî (Bestand) a potential
resource for humans to control, reshape, and
exploit for their purposes. In this context,
ìtechnologyî is not a thing, but an attitude toward
and relation to the world. We regard natural
things in terms of what we can do with them: a
river is a potential source of electrical power; a
tree is a potential table; a canyon a potential
tourist attraction. This attitude and relation, this
ìenframingî (Gestell), in Heideggerís
phenomenology, already transforms the world,
even prior to any actions: the tree is changed
into a thing-that-can-be-used, and is never again
simply a tree, a thing-in-itself. A canyon that you
have to pay to go see is in an important sense
no longer the same canyon that it was before.
On this highly influential view, ìtechnologyî is
something intrinsically damaging, even
insidious, because it robs us of the capacity to
apprehend and appreciate the world simply as
it is. This inverts the understanding of technology
as something useful and beneficial ó even if it
may have dangerous side effects (pollution, say)
ó to something inevitably destructive. On this view,
it is an all-consuming, all-inclusive mindset that
attempts to draw everything into its utilitarian frame
of reference. Heideggerís anti-technological views,
although not referring to computers at all, have
been widely cited in the work of those suspicious
of the rise of digital culture.11
Heidegger contrasts with the
technological attitude a more direct, immediate,
and in some ways almost mystical engagement
with the natural world, in which its being
becomes apparent to us on its own terms, not
on ours. The world that presents itself to us, not
as a potential object for us, is the authentic, na-
tural reality that grounds all being. Here again,
we see an influential idea that has shaped
environmental movements and other back-to-
nature trends ó and at a broad level, the
dichotomy Heidegger is drawing makes some
sense: we know that there are real-estate
developers who look over a wooded valley and
see it only as a potential site for a new
subdivision; or engineers who boat down rivers
looking only for a good place to build a dam. We
have seen the decimation that occurs when
society begins consuming non-renewable na-
tural resources, when humans regard the world
as a domain somehow given to them for their
exclusive use, as opposed to an ecological
system of which humans, like all natural beings,
are a part, and to which we must be ultimately
responsible.
At the same time, it must be said, this
dichotomy is overdrawn. Heideggerís view of
technology is too encompassing, too
deterministic, and his view of nature too romantic.
The origin of human culture is itself grounded in
the first tools, the first attempts to harvest and
later to grow food, the first attempts to build
shelter. If this is inherently an assault on nature,
then there never was a pure, authentic
engagement with it ó†nor ever could be
(because on this view, the ìtechnologicalî attitude
is just as much expressed in ìrenewableî
resource use, low-energy-consuming lifestyles,
the adoption of ìnaturalî foods and fibers, etc.).
On the other side, whenever Heidegger does try
to explain what a non-technological engagement
with nature would look like, his language
becomes allusive and quasi-mystical. Nearly all
of us have a sense of those moments when a
sunset, a surging river, a breathtaking vista,
overwhelm us with their purity and power, but
presumably even real-estate developers and
engineers can experience these too (and then
get back to work planning their next ground-
breaking).
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In the context of computers and digital
culture, this bifurcation of the synthetic and the
real has obscured a deeper understanding of
what is changing in the ways that we make and
explore our worlds, mediated by and through
new technologies. Very rarely, if ever, is there a
ìdirect perceptionî of anything; we actively ob-
serve, select, filter, and interpret our experiences
in all sorts of ways that construct distinct and
sometimes idiosyncratic versions of the world.
Some of these mediations are overtly
technological in nature: eyeglasses, cameras,
telescopes ó or, more subtly, concepts,
categories, theories, and assumptions. The
world we perceive is always already a world we
ìmakeî to some extent.12 This understanding,
then, complicates the picture expressed in
quotes like, ìthe more completely ëvirtual,í the
more completely ëmadeí our lives become, the
more obsessively we search to rediscover
something simply given, something authentic.î13
There is something to this view, of course; but
matters are not so simple. As I noted, the virtual
is a medial concept, between the patently made
and the apparently real.
I do not think I need to review here all the
recent theoretical work that challenges the easy
distinction between representation and reality.14
The boundaries of our ìrealî selves, ìrealî lives,
ìrealî experiences are already fluid and
contingent. An excellent discussion of some of
these issues in the context of new technologies
is Sherry Turkleís book, Life on the Screen,
published in 1995.15 For many of the people she
interviewed, the Internet is a place they inhabit,
not simply a tool they use; some users spend
so much of their day working, playing, interacting,
exploring, and creating online that this becomes
their primary mode of existence ó†what we call
ìordinary lifeî or ìreal lifeî is not what is most
important or ìrealî to them. Plugged in, logged
on, immersed in, what they are doing for hours
at a stretch, for these folks it is no exaggeration
to say that they live in a virtual world. What is
most striking in reading these accounts is how
these people report their preference for the online
world; they say it is more ìrealî to them, more
important to them, and where they feel their
authentic selves get expressed. One important
dimension of this change is how people inhabit
the virtual space; often by constructing online
identities (ìavatarsî) that are different ó
sometimes dramatically different ó from their
ordinary selves (a man representing himself as
a woman; a shy woman representing herself as
sexually aggressive; a black person ìpassingî
as white, or vice versa; a soft-spoken dweeb
posing as a heavily muscled superhero). These
are not in any simple sense ìsubstitutesî for their
ìrealî selves ó performances, fantasies, or role
playing ó because these people often say that
they prefer their online selves, and even say that
these avatars are more truly who they are, or
feel themselves to be, than their apparent
identities. As Turkle notes, this trend is part and
parcel of broader social and cultural trends that
highlight the constructed and non-essentialist
nature of personal identity.16 Either one can
discount these peopleís views as deluded or
pathological, or one must acknowledge that
something new and different is happening for
them. I will return to this theme later.
In this paper I build theoretically off this
conception of the virtual, through a series of
steps. First, I explore four processes of
engagement through which immersion happens
(interest, involvement, imagination, and
interaction); these will prove especially important
for understanding the educational potential of
virtuality. Second, I apply this conception of the
virtual to a discussion of virtual space and time,
suggesting that as virtual spaces become fami-
liar and significant, they become virtual places.
Two ways in which this transformation can take
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place are architecture  and mapping, and I
suggest that in educational contexts these pro-
cesses broadly relate to the perspectives of
teacher and learner, respectively. Architecture and
mapping represent the structures or design
elements in which the four aspects of immersion
are guided toward learning goals; when these
structures are successful, the process of
immersion involves students strongly in the
activities of learning. In this sense, then, it is not
an exaggeration to suggest that all successful
learning environments are, to some extent, ìvir-
tual.î One way to think of this project is as an
attempt to rethink virtuality outside of an
exclusively technological domain, and to see it
as a central educational concept.
Four Aspects of Immersion
It needs to be explained how the virtual
sustains the sense of ìas ifî ó what some call
telepresence, and what I am calling here
immersion.17 I gave several examples previously
of experiences that can sustain a sense of
immersion ó and which are to this extent virtual
experiences: watching a film, reading a book,
listening to music, or being caught up in a reverie
or a conversation. What gives such virtual
experiences this quality of immersion? I define
four interrelated factors at work here: interest,
involvement, imagination, and interaction.18
An experience is interesting to us when it
is complex enough to allow us to pick out new
elements, even with repeated encounters. We
can shift focus and notice things we had not
noticed before. An interesting experience
presents a kind of puzzle that is challenging
enough to engage us in actively trying to work
out what is going on. Even rereading a book or
hearing a piece of music that is very familiar can
have the capacity to interest us anew if there is
enough to it that we can pick out something that
we hadnít noticed before, allowing us to
appreciate it or understand it in a new way.
Interest is one of the qualities that can sustain
the sort of engrossment that makes us
immersed in a virtual experience. But, of course,
interest is not an intrinsic quality of experiences;
what is interesting to me may not be interesting
to you. Something that lacks interest cannot
sustain a truly immersive experience.
An experience is involving when we have
a reason to care about what we are experiencing:
we pay attention to it because it concerns us in
some way. Perhaps there is a narrative structure
involved, or a goal or aim that matters to us, even
if the goal or aim is not intrinsically valuable
(games can be like this, for example, as we lose
ourselves in the playing of them). In some ca-
ses there may be an aesthetic component to
involvement, because we enjoy the experience
and this is what makes us care ó at other times
the experience may not be particularly enjoyable,
but it involves us because it is important for other
reasons (hearing a sad story recounted by a
friend, for example).
An experience engages our imagination
when we can interpolate or extrapolate new
details and add to the experience through our
own contributions. We may be interpreting what
is going on, making guesses about things that
are not immediately present to us (visualizing
the face of a character in a novel, wondering what
her inner thoughts might be; conjuring a mental
image to go along with a piece of music we are
hearing; thinking about what the unseen interior
of a house we see in a painting might look like);
or we may be anticipating what will happen next
in some sequence or development. Actively
going beyond the given is part of what engages
us deeply in it.
An experience is interactive  when it
provides us with opportunities to participate in it,
not only perceptually or intellectually but also
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through embodied action and responses. Many
theorists put interactivity at the forefront of what
makes ìvirtual realityî so vivid and plausible,
because we are able to act upon an environment,
see the effects of our actions, and react to them.
This deeper engagement of our bodyís
movement, activity, and sensations triggers
unconscious responses that make us feel ìthis
is really happening,î below the level of conscious
analysis (for example, how the perceptual field
of a technological ìVRî environment moves as
you move your head wearing goggles or a
helmet). But, again, it is a mistake to think of this
as a factor only in such technological ìVRî
environments. When watching a film or hearing
a story, our posture, body tension, and startle
responses ó or, to take another example, our
relaxation, rhythmic movement, and kinesthetic
sensations listening to music ó are a key
dimension of the quality of immersion that
makes the virtual seem or feel ìrealî to us at the
moment it is happening.
These four qualities, as described here,
are not meant to be exhaustive of all the factors
that constitute the virtual; and they are not entirely
discrete from each other ó one could consider
imagination in the sense defined here as a kind
of interactivity; interest and involvement clearly
can have a lot to do with one another. But I think
they are helpful in clarifying the processes
through which immersion happens; and they
help us understand why immersion can be such
a powerful mode of response. They push our
understanding of the virtual beyond simply
thinking of it in terms of vividness or verisimilitude
(ìit seems so real!î); and they decouple what
makes the virtual, virtual, from the issue of
technology and the specific media through which
engagement happens. All of these qualities
(interest, involvement, imagination, and
interactivity) could be true, for example, of an
intense conversation with a friend recounting a
traumatic event, say, an accident or an assault:
for long stretches the conversation could sustain
an immersive, virtual experience, in which we
are not only listening, but actively engaged with
what they are telling us; all four of the factors
described here could be involved as we identify
with the event and even, in some sense, virtually
re-experience it with them ó we may even feel
as if it were happening to us (we may feel a
sympathetic ache, for example). These four
factors are outgrowths of the relation between
observer and observed: qualities of response to
an experience (in this they might be characterized
in John Deweyís terms as transactional
elements).19 While grounded in characteristics
and qualities of the virtual environment, this
analysis makes clear that immersion is a
consequence of our active response and
engagement with them ó†it is not something
that happens ìtoî us.
This analysis also makes it possible to
see some of the ways in which virtuality can be
abused: as a method of deception or
manipulation, for instance. I have already
described people who state that they prefer their
virtual experiences and identities, consider them
ìmore real,î as far as they are concerned. For
some of these people it may truly be a concern
that they become addicted to virtual experiences,
or can no longer differentiate the virtual from other
modes of experience. Countless science fiction
stories and films (most recently, and perhaps
most famously, The Matrix) have been premised
on the idea that a person may permanently
inhabit the virtual and lose awareness of the
context that gives the virtual experience its
boundaries. Here the illusion/reality dichotomy
seems to re-emerge, but in my view it is more
accurate to say that these are different kinds of
realities, made worlds, some of which are more
susceptible to questioning about how and why
they are made the way that they are (a vivid
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memory which may or may not recall an event
which really happened; an historical text versus
a ìtruthfulî fiction; and so on). It is the lack of an
ability to ask such questions, to regard the context
of any experience as potentially problematic, that
is a potential issue. The whole point of
ìimmersionî is that for periods of time we forget
that we are watching a film, wearing goggles,
sitting in a symphony hall, etc. But if we
perpetually forget this, abuses and dangers can
arise.
On the other hand, turning this question
around, I would argue that this analysis of
immersion, and how it happens, has strong
positive implications for the design of
educational environments and experiences.
Interest, involvement, imagination, and
interactivity, as I have defined them here, are
essential educational resources if we mean to
engage and motivate active student learning: in
this sense, any truly educational experience is
immersive, or in other words, virtual. A virtual
learning environment is not necessarily a
technologically based one, I have stressed, and
other modes of teaching can promote the quality
of immersion. But I do mean to upset the
assumption that face-to-face classroom
interactions are necessarily more authentic,
more meaningful, or more educationally
productive than technologically mediated ones.
For a digital generation, the qualities of interest,
involvement, imagination, and interactivity are to
some extent shaped by their engagements with
technology and the media (computer games,
videos, cell phones and handheld PDAís, etc.)
and educators seeking to attract and retain
student attention will have to learn from what
makes those environments so immersive for
youth. Yet neither am I arguing the superiority of
the technological over the face-to-face. Each
domain has its own unique qualities and
advantages; for this reason the question, to me,
is not a matter of ìWhich is better?î or which
should substitute for the other, but, ìWhat is the
distinct capability of each to support immersive
learning experiences?î (For example, in my
experience, based on several online courses,
there often is more, and more varied, student
interaction and participation in online
discussions than in many regular classroom
seminars ó and for particular students a great
deal more.) The virtual, as I am describing it here,
is not a new fad or a gimmick, but a very concrete
way of rethinking the nature of learning spaces
ó spaces where creativity, problem-solving,
communication, collaboration, experimentation,
and inquiry can happen.
Virtual Space and Time20
People tend to think about the online
environment as a medium; a path of point-to-
point communication. People use the network
like a telephone or mail system to exchange
messages, or to retrieve and download
documents, web pages, and other resources.
To the extent that it is a medium or pathway,
however, it is not neutral — it affects the form of
information and the communication that occur
within it. As many have noted, online text-based
communication has features of both writing and
speech; it is written, of course, but it is often
spontaneous and unedited, like speech. Online
communication is affected by whether it is
synchronous or asynchronous, and is shaped
also by the degree of anonymity provided by not
being in immediate, face-to-face contact with one
another. It can make people more frank and
honest, perhaps, but also less sensitive to the
effects of what they say upon others. This degree
of impersonality can also make participants
oblivious to irony, sarcasm, or intended humor.
In all of these ways the online medium is not a
neutral medium.
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But it is also useful, and more directly
relevant to my purposes here, to think of the
online environment as a space, a place where
people spend time, interact, and do things ó for
example, collaborating with others on a shared
project. The fact that they inhabit a shared space
is essential for this collaboration to work. I do
not mean the medium/space distinction as a
sharp or overly broad dichotomy; different
technologies are designed with one or the other
sort of purpose predominantly in mind. But to
the extent that this is a useful distinction, it helps
us see that the online, networked environment
supports community-building, communication,
and the sharing of resources in ways that are
impossible to explain simply as a series of point-
to-point exchanges. When this online
environment is seen as a space people occupy,
and through which they move, new ways of
thinking about it come to the fore.
First, start with the idea of mobility itself:
movement defines, and is defined by, both space
and time, transiting distance d in length of time t.
Online mobility has a different character, since
what ìmovesî are electrons through cables,
chips, wires, and screens ó but what they carry
(voices, images, information, etc.) has the quality
of virtual movement that defines, and is defined
by, virtual space and time. This is why ìdistance
education,î for example, is becoming an
anachronism: distance is not a primary factor in
how such teaching and learning are accessed
and experienced. The symbol ì@î ó normally
transliterated as ìatî ó is colloquially used as
both a spatial (ìmeet Bob @ cafÈî) and temporal
(ìmeet Bob @ 2:00î) shorthand. But in the online
environment, such as an email address, ì@î
does not necessarily mean ìatî: my email
address may appear to be ìat University of
Illinoisî; but someone else is not in the same
sense ìat yahoo.comî (where is ìyahoo.comî?)21
The nature of our experience in networked
environments is frequently of a kind  of
movement: the most obvious example is
exploring the World Wide Web.22 In following
hyperlinks we do have a sense of moving across
different semantic spaces: we can trace a kind
of trail or pattern to our path; sometimes, we
may feel lost. We might wonder, How did I get
here? It is interesting, and significant in my view,
that these links and pathways have both
semantic as well as navigational
characteristics.23 Here I want to foreground the
question of mobility: we interact with these
networked environments with the language, the
subjective sensibility, and sometimes even the
embodied feeling of movement.
This is dramatically true of certain
technological VR systems: a room-sized VR
space at my university called ìthe Caveî features
a virtual roller coaster ride. I have seen people
almost fall over while ìridingî it, even though they
are standing upright in an empty, unmoving
room, two feet firmly planted on the floor. (I have
not personally seen instances of how this
simulation earned its colloquial name, ìVomit
Mountain.î) I will return later to the nature of
embodiment in such contexts, but I want to
reiterate that this embodied sense of movement
is not unique to VR settings; we might
experience something similar, and just as
powerful, listening to music, watching a film, or
surfing a series of web sites. Are we ìreally
movingî? The question of virtuality wants us to
see that question in a new light: we are really
moving through virtual space and time. You ride
the roller coaster and sway, stumble, and feel
dizzy and nauseous. Is that ìrealî enough for you?
The experience of movement is one on the
primary dimensions underlying the sense of
immersion which, I have suggested, defines the
ìvirtual.î
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But this roller coaster example puts a
rather negative spin on the virtual (though people
do seem to like riding roller coasters, even when
it terrifies them or makes them feel dizzy and
nauseous). In many networked settings this
experience of movement is part of the pleasure
of discovery. (Why else do we label web
browsers with intrepid names like ìExplorer,î
ìNavigator,î and ìSafariî?) It isnít just that one
can be a virtual tourist and go visit web sites
featuring the sights and sounds of sub-Saharan
Africa; it is that even in looking for good barbecue
recipes or checking sport scores or sending
birthday greetings to a cousin or reading an e-
book there is a fluidity and flexibility and
ìtimelessnessî to the way one can browse sites,
or meander through texts, that feels liberating
(note: I am not saying here that space, time, or
embodiment ó of the ìrealî varieties ó
disappear or become irrelevant when we are in
virtual environments; but they do not constitute
fundamental constraints on how we inhabit and
explore such environments).
Second, online mobility is related to
certain things that we can do in virtual space
(and time): we can communicate, interact, ob-
serve, and even act upon objects ìfrom a
distance.î The virtual, Paul Virilio writes, has the
quality of simultaneity.24 This idea of the extension
of our senses and physical capabilities
suggests, to some, the emergence of a ìcyborgî
self, a ìhuman+technologyî entity that is both
more and less than the fully enclosed and self-
sufficient human self. This is not my main
concern here, though I would point out that
prostheses, pace-makers ó or for that matter
eyeglasses and telescopes ó carried us over
this bridge a long time ago. I am concerned with
the experience of this extension as a
transformation of space and time. These
transformations are not only matters of distance;
in the Cave at the University of Illinois you can
observe the development of a fertilized chick
embryo in an egg, from the inside. When we look
at a web-cam, watching our child at play in
preschool or checking the current weather in
Lillehammer, Norway; when we turn off our coffee
maker with a coded beep from our cell phone
while we are driving toward work two miles away;
when we have a synchronous (ìreal time,î we
like to say) conversation with a colleague from
halfway around the world, discussing and
simultaneously revising a draft book chapter we
have posted in a shared writing space, we are,
as I said earlier, doing more than just sending
and receiving a series of electronic messages
back and forth. We are inhabiting and doing
things as actors in a virtual space (and time),
and our expectations, our habits, our
relationships, and our values are reshaped by
the fact that we are actors in virtual space and
time. ìRealî space and time do not disappear or
become irrelevant; for one thing, they provide the
experiences and the vocabulary that we carry over
to the virtual domain as a way of making sense
of it; furthermore, they provide a context that gives
the sense of movement within virtual space and
time part of its force (the fact that we know the
colleague is halfway around the world; that the
websites we move between have been
developed by people who never will meet each
other; that we can ìfast forwardî the stages of
development of the chick embryo, etc.). But it is
also true that for many people, their activities in
virtual space and time provide a set of
experiences and vocabulary for how they make
sense of ìrealî space and time too.
Third, our engagement with virtual space
and time is linked to the fact of our embodiment.25
We may have virtual identities and experiences,
but these are not set against our ìrealî embodied
identities and experiences; on the contrary, by
basing the concept of the virtual on immersion,
and showing how our embodied selves, in
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interaction with a situation or set of experiences,
are part of what creates this sense of immersion,
what makes it seem or feel ìrealî to us (for
example, that the field of view shifts as we turn
our heads), the two domains cannot be
understood apart from each other, or even less
in opposition to each other.
Another way in which our bodies do not
disappear or become irrelevant is that while their
internal ìclocks,î their needs for rest and for food,
may move into the background of our awareness
when we are in an immersive experience, these
needs have a way of intruding themselves upon
us whether we like it or not ó and, of course,
without attention to such ìrealî needs none of
the rest would matter anyway.
One might even say that our bodied
selves are the sites on which the real and the
virtual play off each other (for instance, it is the
disjunct between what our eyes seem to be
telling us and the feedback from our own inner
ears that makes the roller coaster ride in the
Cave so disorienting). We feel an interaction with
a virtual world because we feel it; immersion is,
revealingly, itself a bodily metaphor.
This intimate connection is even more
apparent with the growing interest in haptics: the
use of touch and feel as the basis for a human/
machine interface. Control gloves were one of
the first areas explored in this domain: one can,
wearing a glove containing sensors, move, pick
up, and manipulate objects in a virtual world
(remember the scene in the movie Disclosure
where the character is rifling though folders in a
digital file drawer); or to control robotic machines
that translate oneís movements into a distant
location. One dimension of haptics is to
strengthen the sense of ìaction at a distanceî:
imagine being able to pick up a rock on the lunar
surface, heft its weight, feel its texture, and so
on.26 Another dimension of haptics is to exploit
the particular sensitivity of our sense of touch as
the locus of experiencing a virtual domain,
providing feedback not just through visual and
audial cues but through a tap on the shoulder, a
vibration or change in temperature, or, for
example, through a seat that allows us to ìmoveî
through a virtual domain through movements of
our body or shifts of our weight, while
communicating back to us a subtle sense of
movement or location that provides us with a
way of orienting ourselves within a complex
domain. Here again our embodied selves do
not become irrelevant; quite the contrary.
Finally, there are questions of
embodiment and identity, which I introduced
earlier in discussing Turkleís Life on the Screen.
For Turkle, the Internet is a zone of enormous
creativity and experimentation in forming virtual
identities. Decoupled from the apparent one-to-
one association of body and identity, participants
online are exploring identities, perspectives, and
modes of interaction that are not constrained by
their ìrealî selves: pretending to be a character
of the opposite gender in a chat room, putting
out provocative opinions that are not necessarily
oneís own, just to see where the discussion will
take them, and so on. For many people these
can be tremendously liberating experiments.
These arenít necessarily false identities; they may
in fact involve exploring aspects or extrapolations
of oneís actual identity that cannot be enacted
without disapproval, harm, or other
consequences in oneís ordinary life. So, again,
ìrealî versus ìfalseî identities is too neat a
dichotomy, which does not capture the ways in
which these can be different versions of oneís
identity. People sometimes say that these virtu-
al identities are in fact more truly who they feel
themselves to be. These identities often become
the basis on which interaction and involvement
take place in virtual contexts; and they support a
sense of significance related to how interest and
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imagination get triggered. Hence they can be
fundamental to the process of how immersion
takes place.
To be sure, these experiments in identity
can be subject to abuses ó where playing with
an alternative identity can become
impersonation or deception (the legendary ìAlexî
affair, in which a male psychiatrist posed in a
women-only chat room as a character named
Joan),27 or where playful online interactions can
have dire real-world consequences (a rape in
cyberspace),28 or where participants cannot
integrate their various selves into a coherent
identity (that is, a form of schizophrenia), or where
they can no longer differentiate between the real
and the virtual.29
An MCI commercial once said, when
youíre online, there is no race, no gender, no
disability. This is not really true: all of these
factors clearly impinge on who is participating
online, who is not (the digital divide), and on how
those who are online interact with each other ó
many claim they can identify gender just by
othersí speech patterns, for example. People
donít lose their embodied identities when they
act anonymously or pretend to be other than they
are. But the relative anonymity of online interaction
can suppress the effects of prejudice or
discrimination. Others are forced to deal more with
the content of what one says or does, not
necessarily with what one looks like. It is important
to remember that the embodied experience for
many people is seriously limited: by disability,
infirmity, illness, chronic pain, isolation, or a
physical appearance that leads others to prejudge,
ignore, or despise them. For many of these people,
their virtual identities expand their opportunities
and sense of efficacy. Here as elsewhere in these
sorts of arguments, claims about which mode of
interaction is ìbetterî must always be tempered
by asking, ìbetter for whom?î30
In the end, it is not the existence of new
technologies that has raised questions about
the necessity of our bodies for our sense of
identity; it is a much larger cultural shift that
foregrounds the ìperformativeî rather than
ìessentialî character of our embodied selves.
Every day people play at other roles in relation to
gender, race, sexuality, etc., regardless of their
ìbodilyî facts. For others, I have tried to make
clear, the embodied self is seen as an artificial
constraint, falsely prioritizing one dimension of
identity (which is itself a changeable social
construction) over others. For the different, the
hybrid, the disabled, and others, it is experienced
as tremendously liberating not  to allow an
embodied physical ìfactî to be so determining;
and the virtual is proving a fascinating zone of
experimentation in how people can move beyond
these embodied physical facts, not necessarily
for the sake of ìescapingî them or denying them,
but for changing what they mean to themselves
and to others.
In this section I have been asking, If
immersion is the basis of virtual experience,
what are we immersed ìinî? The dynamics of
interaction, imagination, interest, and
involvement which create the sense of immersion
in virtual space and time, I have argued, are
closely tied to experiences of mobility,
inhabitance, action at a distance, haptic
sensitivity, and performative identities that each,
in various ways, engage our embodied selves.
In this context, it is important to see, virtual
movement, virtual identities, virtual action at a
distance, and so on, are not simulated or illusory
experiences: they are real in the context of virtual
space and time ó as real as can be. And their
sense of veracity, their ìas ifî quality, is intimately
tied to the fact that these experiences are
implicated in our actual embodied selves, and
vice versa; they should not be seen as separate
from or in opposition to them.
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But there is another stage of
transformation. Eventually, the sense of
inhabitance, familiarity, and comfort people feel
in virtual space and time ó especially when
these are experienced in conjunction with the
similar engagements of other people ó achieve
a further qualitative shift: from virtual spaces to
virtual places.
Virtual Places
Calling the online environment a space
captures the idea of movement and activity within
it, the possibility of discovering meaningful
connections between elements found there; but
it does not capture the distinctive ways in which
people can make a space familiar, make it their
space ó†make it a place. This shift from thinking
in terms of spaces to places reflects an important
theoretical and practical difference. A place is a
socially or subjectively meaningful space. It has
an objective, locational dimension: people can
look for a place, find it, move within it. But it also
means something important to a person or a
group of people, and this latter, more subjective,
dimension may or may not be communicable to
others. When people are in a place, they know
where they are, and what it means to be there.
Place also has an important temporal
dimension, because places emerge, change,
and develop diachronically: a space may be a
place at one point in time, but not earlier or later;
or it may become a different kind of place.31
The transactional elements of interest,
involvement, interaction, and imagination, as I
have defined them here, are not just qualities of
response to an experience: they actively shape
and change the experience. We might not just
visit a space; after a while we move in, start to
rearrange the furniture, so to speak, and make it
comfy. Spaces are transformed by such activities.
And, as I have mentioned, this is not necessarily
an individual endeavor, but can be a collective
one ó  indeed, it is often the quality of a space
as a shared space that plays a crucial role in its
development into a place. Things happen there,
memorable things (whether pleasant or
unpleasant, but important), which mark the
space as a place (ìthis is where it happenedî).
Places become familiar, acclimated to us as we
are to them. They become marked by various
social conventions (rules, norms, customs,
vocabularies). They become, in many cases, a
locus of community. In all of these respects a
relatively objective space and time, a pre-
transformative given, becomes something
marked, signified, important: and in this both the
space and those inhabiting it are changed in
relation to each other. A place is a special,
important kind of space; but those occupying it
also stand in a different relation to the space,
and to each other, because they are there. In this
description I have purposely not emphasized
whether these must be virtual spaces becoming
virtual places; this dynamic is true of spaces
and places generally (a crossroads, a battlefield,
a classroom, a lovers lane). Or perhaps it is more
accurate to say that insofar as spaces become
places there is always an element of the virtual
to them (in other words, there is a quality of
immersion, supported by the elements of
interest, involvement, interaction, and
imagination).
It is possible to theorize more broadly
what is going on here. There are two distinctive
ways in which we turn spaces into places.32 One
is by mapping: by developing schemata that
represent the space, identify important points
within it, and facilitate movement within it. A map
is never an exact replica (as the story goes, the
only map that would be identical would be an
exact copy of the original, which would be useless
as a map) ó†a map always simplifies, selects,
and schematizes the original, and it is the parti-
cular way in which this simplification, selection,
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and schematization occur that makes this
version of the space a place. These are
pragmatic activities; we make certain, and not
other, choices because they allow us to do things
in the space that are meaningful and important
to us. There can be multiple maps, and in this
sense they constitute different places, even when
they refer to the same space.
There are also maps that represent
patterns of use. Trails that are worn by many feet
tramping through forests, or across campus
greens, are maps of a sort. Again, they simplify,
select, and schematize a space: they identify
what is important to people, they mark out key
places, they facilitate movement. They also
indicate another important characteristic of
maps: how their use can also shape and
transform the space they represent. This can be
seen at work in the World Wide Web, for example,
through frequency indicators: page counters, for
example, as well as ratings of ìmost frequently
visitedî sites. Such representations tend to
influence patterns of future use, because they
influence how search engines pick out and
identify sites, which sites get selected for
indexes, and so on. Viewed pragmatically, the
representation is not discrete from the thing
represented; it acts upon and is acted upon by it.
Yet another kind of map is one showing
relations of relative centrality and relative
periphery, from some point or points of reference.
The repetitiveness of ìrelativeî here is not
accidental: there can be no absolute center of a
space that is any more necessary than any other
ó in fact, it is as true to say that a center is defined
by the map, as to say that the map begins from
a center. And a more rhizomic map may have no
single center at all. But a map of relative centrality
and periphery can still provide a way of
simplifying, selecting, and schematizing the
pragmatic relation of what is more or less useful
or relevant to a given purpose, or set of purposes.
This sort of endeavor can be highly useful even
though there is nothing necessary about this
particular mapping, even if others would map it
differently ó indeed, we should expect this to be
true in order for such maps of relative centrality
and periphery to be useful to different people
(because their purposes and criteria will differ).
In sum, a map does two things as once:
it marks significant places; and it makes places
significant by marking them. To return again to
the four elements of immersion: mapping is a
process that makes manifest our involvement
with a space, the places we care about; it is an
expression of interest, as mapping is a kind of
problem-solving (how do we find our way about);
it entails an act of imagination, because mapping
is a process of selecting what is judged to be
significant enough to include, and of adding a
structure of association and organization for what
is selected (in other words, it is both less and
more than the original); and finally mapping is a
process of interaction, changing what is mapped,
from space to place, in the process of trying to
describe it.
The second distinctive way in which
spaces become places is through architecture.
A space becomes a place when we build into it
enduring structures. Often we live in these
structures, work in them, observe or admire
them. We are changed by these things we create
as we change them ó the relation runs both
ways. Architecture here is not only the initial
design or building, but the transformation of it
over time; in this sense, we always help build
the structures we occupy, and the structures are
not fully finished until they have been used for a
while (in one sense, then, they are never
ìfinishedî). Here I do not mean architecture only
in the literal sense of buildings and bridges; there
are architectures also of language, of customs,
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of complex practices and activities (games, for
example); all of these can play a role in
transforming a space into a place.
Architectures transform not only a space
but the patterns of activity for those who occupy
them. I think that these patterns can be viewed
along five polarities:
(1) movement/stasis
(2) interaction/isolation
(3) publicity/privacy
(4) visibility/hiddenness
(5) enclosure/exclusion
These interrelated dynamics shape the
ways in which participants operate within a
space, and the particular constellation of them
gives a space its distinctive character as a certain
kind of place: for example, structures along the
polarity of isolation, hiddenness, and privacy,
versus those emphasizing visibility, interaction,
and publicity.
(1) Structures facilitate, direct, or inhibit
movement. They anticipate the way in which
people are likely to navigate a space, but by
making this assumption they also tend to direct
it. In an art museum, for example, this is reflected
in choices such as what exhibits to put near each
other, and where to put doorways. Where will
people want to pause, and which paintings will
they want to linger over? Yet there are substantive
assumptions at work here as well: let say one
wants to learn about historical periods in art, but
finds that the rooms have been organized by
subject matter or styles of painting; all the
information is there the visitor might want, but
not in a pattern that supports the inferences he
or she is trying to make. Which room to start
with? Where to go next? The visitorís confusion
and uncertainty may also be a kind of paralysis,
even though the design of the museum is, on its
own terms, quite clear and easily navigated.
(2) The design of spaces also
communicates assumptions and expectations
about social interaction. Architectures, by
directing movement, create avenues to bring
people together or barriers to keep them apart.
Where will crowds tend to congregate, for
example? Architectures also make assumptions
about the kinds of things people will be doing in
a space, and whether they want to be doing it
with others or alone. Again, these assumptions
also shape behaviors: if a telephone booth is
only big enough for one person, three girl friends
canít all talk to their friend at the same time; they
have to decide who gets to talk first, which may
start an argument.
(3) Publicity and privacy constitute a
slightly different issue, which is the extent to
which an architecture allows or inhibits the
disclosure of the participantsí selves, their
activities, and not only their words and ideas, to
others (and vice-versa). Are walls transparent;
or are there walls at all? Can you be seen, or do
you always know you might be seen, and how
does this tend to encourage or discourage
certain things you might do? Can you choose
when you can be seen, and when you do not
want to be?
(4) Visibility and hiddenness, here, refer
to the transparency of architectures, to what they
disclose or conceal within, and to what they
disclose or conceal about themselves. This is
not quite the same as publicity and privacy,
because here what is exposed or hidden are
characteristics of the architecture itself. Does a
wall close off a room that only some people know
how to get to? Where does this doorway lead,
and who is allowed through it?
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(5) Architectures also operate through
enclosure and exclusion; what (or who) is
counted in and what is counted out. Some
structures are intended to define a community
made special in its own eyes by its privileged
access and made to feel safe so that others
viewed as less worthy will not interfere. The very
attractions of such a partitioned space give rise
to its limitations: the risk of complacency and
numbing homogeneity. If we assume that certain
kinds of change and development can only come
from encounters with new and challenging ideas,
this architecture of enclosure and exclusion may
seem less like a protective shell, and more like
a self-built prison.
There is much more to be said about
architecture and the dynamics of shaping
spaces into places; but here again I want to
return to the dynamics of virtuality. I have tried to
indicate how specific design features express
assumptions about social dynamics, about
values, about knowledge and substantive
subject matter; in this, I have tried to enlarge the
concept of ìarchitectureî to mean much more
than just the design of rooms and buildings.
Architectures reveal and conceal; they facilitate
and discourage; they welcome and exclude; they
direct and redirect and inhibit certain choices. In
all this, architectures assume particular modes
of interest, involvement, interaction, and
imagination ó and in these assumptions tend
to bring them about (or to suppress other
modes).
In summary, I have explained two different
ways in which spaces become places. The first
is mapping, which is in some ways a more
reactive process; a process of representing a
space in order to be able to move and work within
it. A mapped space takes on the character of a
place for those who understand and can use
the map. The second way in which spaces
become places is through architectures;
enduring structures that reconfigure spaces.
This is in some ways a more active process, in
which the space is not only represented
(mapped) but transformed. There are at least
five ways, I have suggested, in which this
transformation affects not only the configuration
of space but also the activities and the persons
who operate within it. These dimensions deter-
mine the kind of place it is. I do not mean to
argue that the activities of mapping and
architecture are utterly unrelated or dichotomous:
sometimes a map is prefatory to designing a
structure (a blueprint is a kind of map, in fact);
sometimes a large, complex architectural layout
includes maps or directional markers within it
as a way of helping people get around; trails, as
I describe them here, have features of both. But
the ways in which mapping and architecture
influence navigation and meaning-making are
different; and they suggest something important,
I think, about virtual learning environments.
Virtual Learning Environments
Earlier, I described virtual learning
environments as spaces where creativity,
problem-solving communication, collaboration,
experimentation, and inquiry can happen.33 But
now we can give greater specificity to how they
happen. Let me suggest that mapping indicates,
on the whole, the perspective of the learner, while
architecture indicates more the perspective of
the teacher (though again, I am not trying to
separate these entirely). A learner is asking, How
do I find my way about? A teacher is asking, How
do I design this learning space in such a way
that my students will explore and use it in the
way I intend for them to? Mapping and
architecture are both ways of turning spaces into
places, generally; but in the context of this paper
I am interested in how they turn virtual spaces
into virtual places ó†and more specifically, virtu-
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al learning spaces into meaningful, hospitable
virtual learning places. They do this by guiding
the dynamics of interest, involvement, imagination,
and interaction in ways that are judged to be
productive (in this case, educationally productive);
when they are successful, the learning space
becomes immersive ó the learner is engaged,
actively relating to the subject matter, seeing (and
I will add here feeling) its importance. As I
mentioned before, a place (as opposed to a
space) always entails to some extent the quality
of the virtual; and so in this sense it is no
exaggeration to say that a successful learning
space, as it becomes a learning place, is in a
wider sense by definition virtual.
Now I think you can see the larger
purpose of my discussion here: to remove the
virtual from a fundamentally technological
domain and situate it at the core of educational
theory and practice. How do we make learning
immersive? What role does interest,
involvement, imagination, and interaction play
as dimensions of active engagement between
a learner and a learning environment? In what
ways are these activities linked with mapping?
How can we theorize teaching as the design of
architectures of learning spaces ó architectures
that allow learners to inhabit and experience them
as places of interest and familiarity? How do
these structures of the virtual express (and
thereby reinforce) deeper assumptions about
social community, value, equity, and the nature
of knowledge? Do they assume standardized
models of engagement, or tolerate, even
encourage, the expression and exploration of
alternative identities? These important
questions each need to be elaborated in further
studies.
This rethinking of the virtual as an
educational concept34 poses a sharp contrast to
much current practice: in highlighting the
centrality of choice, decision, and exploration as
important dimensions of learning; in thinking in
terms of learning spaces (learning places),
rather than ìdelivery systemsî; in seeing these
learning places as potential sites of collaboration
and communities of learners, and not just indi-
vidual achievement; and in recognizing that the
face-to-face classroom, as it is currently
constituted, is by no means necessarily more
humane or authentic than alternative learning
spaces. One can see these issues arising in
how new information and communication
technologies are being thought about and used
in schools ó†but as should be apparent they
raise much larger questions about the ways that
we think about teaching and learning in general.
I hope to have laid the groundwork for a
reconception of the virtual, and to have engaged
in an exercise in virtuality here: beginning the
design of a theoretical architecture that invites
engagement and exploration. If I have been
successful in some measure, you have moved
into this space yourself and begun to make it a
place of your own. It may not be the same as
mine. But an academic article can also be a vir-
tual environment ó one that you complement
through your own interest, involvement,
imagination, and interaction.
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